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ARGUMENT
I.

INTRODUCTION

Utah law is clear that directors and officers of a Utah corporation owe the
corporation the fiduciary duty of loyalty, which includes the duty to act in good
faith. See Utah Code § 16-1oa-840(1); Nicholson v. Evans, 642 P.2d 727, 730
(Utah 1982). Utah law is also clear that a director or officer's use of material nonpublic corporate information to benefit him or herself constitutes a breach of
fiduciary duty. C & Y Corp. v. Gen. Biometrics, Inc., 896 P.2d 47, 54 (Utah Ct.
App. 1995) ("The trial court was also correct in determining that breach of
fiduciary duty encompasses situations in which corporate directors use
confidential information to the corporation's detriment. . . . [The defendant
directors] bear the burden of showing their good faith and fair dealing .... For
instance, they must show ... they did not use confidential information to further
their own interests . . . . ") (citations omitted); Glen Allen Mining Co. v. Park

Galena Mining Co., 77 Utah 362, 385, 296 P. 231 (1931) ("[directors and officers]
are not permitted to profit as individuals by virtue of their position").
In this case, Rawcliffe 1 alleges that the Directors and Officers knew the
Company was about to release news that would drive up the price of USANA's
stock, and the members of the Compensation Committee deliberately awarded
the stock appreciation rights ("SSARs") to themselves and the other Directors

All capitalized terms have the same meaning as ascribed in the Opening Brief of
Appellant ("Opening Br.").
1

and Officers just before disclosing the market-moving news. The Compensation
Committee members thus took advantage of material non-public information to
grant themselves and the other Directors and Officers SSARs with a lower
exercise price-and hence more value-than if the information had been available
to the market. The Directors and Officers therefore breached their fiduciary duty
of loyalty and good faith by using "confidential information to further their own
interests." C & Y Corp., 896 P.2d at 54 (citation omitted). Moreover, because
Rawcliffe alleges that the Compensation Committee members deliberately
spring-loaded the SSAR grants, they engaged in "willful misconduct" that is not
protected by Utah's business judgment rule, upon which the Directors and
Officers so heavily rely. See Utah Code§ 16-10a-840(4)(b) (directors and officers
can be held liable for "gross negligence, willful misconduct, or intentional
infliction of harm on the corporation or the shareholders").
The Directors and Officers tout the fact that the exercise price of the SSARs
was equal to the trading price of USANA stock on the date the SSARs were
granted, and they argue that the grants therefore complied with the strict letter of
the Plan, but that fact cannot bear the weight the Directors and Officers put on it.
This is not a breach of contract case alleging that the Directors and Officers
breached the terms of the Plan. Rather, this is a case alleging that the Directors
and Officers breached their fiduciary duty of loyalty and good faith by using their
knowledge of material non-public information to manipulate the timing of equity
awards and a news release for their own benefit. Courts in other jurisdictions
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have consistently held that such allegations state a claim for breach of fiduciary
duty despite the fact that defendants complied with the letter of the corporation's
compensation plan. See, e.g., In re CytRx Corp. S'holder Derivative Litig., C.A.
No. 9864-VCL, Oral Argument, Defendants' Motions to Stay or Dismiss and the
Court's Rulings (TRANSCRIPT) at 39:13-40:2 (Del. Ch. Jan. 8, 2015) (Opening
Br. Addenda D) (denying motion to dismiss claim for breach of fiduciary duty by
approving spring-loaded stock option grants) ; Weiss v. Swanson, 948 A.2d 433,
448-49 (Del. Ch. 2008) (same); In re Tyson Foods, Inc. Consol. S'holder Litig.,
919 A.2d 563, 593 (Del. Ch. 2007) (same); Ausikaitis v. Kiani, 962 F. Supp. 2d
661, 670, 679 (D. Del. 2013) (same). The District Court's holding to the contrary
is fundamentally inconsistent with Utah law, and this Court should therefore
reverse the District Court's ruling and remand this case for further proceedings.
II.

UTAH LAW DOES NOT PERMIT CORPORATE FIDUCIARIES
TO USE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION FOR THEIR OWN
BENEFIT

A.

The Standard of Conduct Demanded of Directors and
Officers of Utah Corporations

Under Utah law, "directors and officers are required to carry out their
corporate duties in good faith, with prudent care, and in the best interest of the
corporation." McLaughlin v. Schenk, 2009 UT 64,

~16,

220 P. 3d 146 (citing

Utah Code §16-10-a-840). This principle is well-established both in the Utah
Revised Business Corporation Act and in Utah common law, including in the
cases cited by the Directors and Officers.

See Utah Code § 16-1oa-840(1)

(directors and officers shall discharge their duties "(a) in good faith; (b) with the

care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar
circumstances; and (c) in a manner the director or officer reasonably believes to
be in the best interests of the corporation"); Glen Allen, 77 Utah at 384-85
("'Directors and other officers must exercise the utmost good faith in all
transactions touching their duties to the corporation and its property"' (quoting 4
Fletcher, Cyc. Corp. § 2272)); Elggren v. Woolley, 64 Utah 183, 192, 228 P. 906
(1924) ("Directors of a corporation occupy a position of trust and confidence and
are considered in the law as standing in a fiduciary relation toward the
stockholders. . . . The directors of a corporation are not permitted to use their
position of trust and confidence to further their private interests .... " (citations
and quotations omitted)); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Hess, 820 F. Supp. 1359,
1365 (D. Utah 1993) (cited by Directors and Officers in the Response Brief of
Defendant-Appellees at 24 ("Resp. Br.")) ("Utah clearly recognizes the duty of
loyalty."). As the Directors and Officers point out repeatedly in their Response
Brief, Section 16-1oa-840 further provides that a director or officer is not liable to
the corporation unless his or her breach or failure to perform his or duties
"constitutes gross negligence, willful misconduct, or intentional infliction of harm
on the corporation or the stockholders." Utah Code§ 16-1oa-840(4)(b).
Contrary to the Directors' and Officers' contentions, however, Utah law
does not give them carte blanche to use confidential corporate information to
benefit themselves. In fact, Utah case law, both before and after the adoption of
Section 16-1oa-840, makes clear that fiduciaries of Utah corporations are not

permitted to use their knowledge of material non-public information for their
own benefit. See Glen Allen, 77 Utah at 384-85 ('"All [directors' and officers']
acts must be for the benefit of the corporation and not for their own benefit....
They are not permitted to profit as individuals by virtue of their position."'
(quoting 4 Fletcher, Cyc. Corp. § 2272)); Nicholson, 642 P.2d at 730 ("Directors
and officers have a fiduciary duty of loyalty to their corporation and its
stockholders .... They are obligated to use their ingenuity, influence, and energy,
and to employ all the resources of the corporation, to preserve and enhance the
property and earning power of the corporation, even if the interests of the
corporation are in conflict with their own personal interests."); Bingham Consol.

Co. v. Groesbeck, 2004 UT App 434,

~22,

105 P.3d 365 (same); Elggren, 64 Utah

at 194 ("[C]ourts have adopted and are strictly and rigidly enforcing a policy
which minimizes the temptation of officers of corporations to prefer their own
interests rather than those of the corporation and the stockholders."); Chapman

v. Troy Laundry Co., 87 Utah 15, 36, 47 P.2d 1054 (1935) (relied upon by
Directors and Officers at Resp. Br. 25) ("it is the duty of the directors of the
corporation to exercise their functions in good faith with a view to promoting the
welfare of the corporation, and that if they sell or dispose of the corporate
property with a view to gain personal advantage rather than for the purpose of
enhancing the interests of the corporation, they are guilty of bad faith");

Resolution Trust Corp., 820 F. Supp. at 1365 (relied upon by Directors and
Officers at Resp. Br. 24) (the duty of loyalty in Utah "requires a director, among
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other things, to act in good faith and in the best interests of the corporation, and
prohibits directors from engaging in self-dealing").

Furthermore, the Utah

Revised Business Corporation Act specifically prohibits Utah corporations from
limiting the liability of directors for "the amount of a financial benefit received by
a director to which he is not entitled[.]" Utah Code§ 16-1oa-84i.
Throughout their Response Brief, the Directors and Officers repeatedly
state that the Complaint was properly dismissed because the Compensation
Committee complied with the express terms of the Plan in setting the exercise
price of the SSARs equal to the market price of USANA's stock on the day of the
grants. The pertinent issue in this action, however, is not whether the Directors
and Officers violated the terms of the Plan, but whether Rawcliffe adequately
states a claim that the Directors and Officers breached their fiduciary duties of
loyalty and good faith. Although the Directors and Officers complied with the
terms of the Plan, that does not necessarily mean they acted in good faith.
Indeed, as the Directors and Officers note, the Plan is silent with respect to the
timing of equity awards vis-a-vis corporate announcements. See Resp. Br. at 20.
Accordingly, to determine whether Rawcliffe has stated a claim upon which relief
may be granted, the Court should look not to the Plan, but to Utah statutory and
case law.
Well established Utah law plainly holds that the duty of loyalty and good
faith

prohibits

corporate fiduciaries

from using confidential corporate

information to benefit themselves. See, e.g., C & Y Corp., 896 P.2d at 54, Glen
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Allen, 77 Utah at 382-83 (citing Trice v. Comstock, 121 F. 620 (8th Cir. 1903));
Elggren, 64 Utah at 192 (citation omitted). And this principle remains applicable
regardless

of the

Directors'

and Officers'

compliance with the Plan.

Consequently, even though the Plan did not explicitly preclude the Directors
and Officers from taking advantage of the market price of USANA's stock when
they had knowledge of market-moving information the market did not have,

Utah law did prohibit them from using their knowledge to benefit themselves in
any way, including by timing the SSAR grants and the news release to ensure the
SSARs were priced just before the news caused the market price of USANA stock
to jump up. The District Court, which focused principally, if not entirely, on the
Directors' and Officers' compliance with the Plan, erred in dismissing Rawcliffe's
claims, and this Court should reverse that erroneous decision.
Indeed, none of the Utah cases upon which the Directors and Officers rely
supports dismissal of Rawcliffe's claims. For example, in Resolution Trust Corp.
(see Resp. Br. at 24), the federal district court held that "there exists no issue as
to the breach of defendants' duty of loyalty" because, unlike in the instant action,
the plaintiff "[did] not allege bad faith or self dealing." 820 F. Supp. at 1365.
Moreover, immediately after the sentence the Directors and Officers cite in their
Response Brief, the court in Resolution Trust Corp. went on to summarize the
Utah business judgment rule, stating "[i]f ... directors, acting in goodfaith,
and with reasonable care, skill, and diligence, nevertheless fall into a mistake,
either of law or fact, they will not be held liable for the consequences of their

actions." Id. at 1367 (emphasis added and citation omitted). In the case at bar
Rawcliffe is not challenging a "mistake" by the Directors and Officers; rather, he
is challenging their intentional use of non-public corporate information to benefit
themselves, which is the antithesis of "acting in good faith" and adequately states
a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Contrary to the Directors' and Officers' suggestion, in Reedeker v.

Salisbury, 952 P.2d 577 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), this Court did not hold that Section
16-1oa-840 protects directors and officers unless "a plaintiff can make a
heightened showing of fraudulent intent or utter indifference." Resp. Br. at 24.
Rather, Reedeker merely quoted the language of Section 16-1oa-840 in a footnote
and held that it did not apply to trustees of a condominium association.

Reedeker, 952 P.2d at 583 & n.6. In so doing, the Reedeker court did not analyze
the pleading requirements for a claim of breach of fiduciary duty in the corporate
context nor did it hold that a plaintiff had to show "fraudulent intent or utter
indifference" in any context. Resp. Br. at 24.

B.

Delaware Law Prohibiting Spring-Loading Is Consistent
With Utah Law

The Directors and Officers would have this Court believe that Delaware
sets a higher bar for its directors and officers than Utah does, and while springloading is prohibited in Delaware, Utah directors and officers are free to take
advantage of material non-public information to grant themselves and their
fellow insiders favorably priced equity awards whenever the opportunity presents
itself. Resp. Br. at 6 (arguing Utah's business judgment rule is different from
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Delaware's business judgment rule); id. at 21 (same); id. at 27 (same); id. at 3435 (same). This argument is baseless because the fiduciary duties of Delaware
officers and directors are functionally identical to those of their Utah
counterparts. In both Delaware and Utah, directors and officers are required to
act loyally, in good faith, and with due care. See In re Orchard Enters., Inc.

S'holder Litig., 88 A.3d 1, 32-33 (Del. Ch. 2014); Utah Code§ 16-1oa-840(1). In
Delaware directors cannot be exculpated from liability for "intentional
misconduct," 8 Del. C. § 102(b)(7), and in Utah directors cannot be exculpated
from liability for "willful misconduct." Utah Code§ 16-1oa-840(4)(b). Case law
from both Delaware and Utah plainly holds that directors using confidential
corporate information to benefit themselves is an "intentional" /"willful" act that
is not in good faith. Glen Allen, 77 Utah at 384-85; Nicholson, 642 P.2d at 730;

Bingham, 2004 UT App 434,

~22;

Elggren, 64 Utah at 194; Tyson, 919 A.2d at

593; Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 505 (Del. Ch. 2003) (citing Brophy v.

Cities Service, Inc., 70 A.2d 5 (Del. 1949)). In light of the bodies of law in both
states, there is no rational basis to conclude that Utah law should treat springloading differently than Delaware law does. 2

While it is not binding authority, Delaware law is instructive because the
Delaware Court of Chancery, renowned throughout the country for its expertise
in corporate law, has dealt with allegations of spring-loading on numerous
occasions. See CytRx Tr. at 28:30-42:14; Weiss, 948 A.2d at 438-50; Tyson, 919
A.2d at 575-76, 591-93. In fact, just one day before Rawcliffe filed his Opening
Brief, the Court of Chancery denied in part defendants' motion to dismiss the
plaintiffs breach of fiduciary duty claims in yet another spring-loading case. See
Larkin v. O'Connor, C.A. No. 11338-CB, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and the
2

In support of their attempt to distinguish Utah law from Delaware law, the
Directors and Officers cite Brewster v. Brewster, 2010 UT App 260, i-120 n.10,
241 P.3d 357, for the proposition that "this Court has previously declined to
follow Delaware law in certain cases as 'unhelpful because [it] do[es] not involve
the interpretation of statutes similar' to the Revised Business Corporation Act."
Resp. Br. at 36.

Brewster is inapposite, however, because the instant case

involves interpretation of fiduciary duties that are identical under both the Utah
Revised Business Corporation Act and Delaware common law. The Directors and
Officers further refer to "Utah's unique business judgment rule," id., but in the
context of this case there is nothing "unique" about it. On the contrary, the
business judgment rule does not protect directors' use of confidential corporate
information to benefit themselves in either Delaware or Utah.
III.

THE INSTANT ACTION IS VIRTUALLY IDENTICAL TO THE
DELAWARE SPRING-LOADING CASES AND SHOULD NOT
BE DISMISSED

The Directors and Officers disingenuously attempt to distinguish the facts
of the instant action from those in Tyson and Weiss by misstating the facts of
those cases. In reality, the instant action is substantially identical to those cases

Court's Partial Ruling (TRANSCRIPT) at 69:10-16 (Del. Ch. Mar. 22, 2016)
(attached as Addendum A). In Larkin the Court of Chancery denied defendants'
motion to dismiss plaintiffs breach of fiduciary duty and unjust enrichment
claims against the Compensation Committee members who granted the springloaded options to themselves. Id. The court has not yet issued a decision on the
motion to dismiss the remaining claims against the remaining defendants. Id. at
73:10-74:9.
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(as well as CytRx and Larkin), and therefore the holdings in those cases are
instructive here. As in the instant case, in both Tyson and Weiss:
• The company had a stockholder-approved equity compensation
plan. (R. 10, 31-56); Tyson, 919 A.2d at 575, 593; Weiss, 948 A.2d at

• The purpose of the plan was to align the interests of the directors
and officers of the company with stockholders and incentivize
continuing employment with the Company and strong performance.
(R. 10, 31); Weiss, 948 A.2d at 438.

• The plan required that grants be made at fair market value, which
was defined in the plan as the trading price on the date the grant was
made. (R.

11,

40); Tyson, 919 A.2d at 575 n.15 (under the terms of

Tyson's stock incentive plan, "[t]he exercise price of an incentive

stock option may not be less than the fair market value of the Class A
Common Stock on the date of the grant") (emphasis in original);

Weiss, 948 A.2d at 439 (under the terms of Linear's stockholderapproved option plan, "the per Share exercise price shall be no less
than 100% of the Fair Market Value per Share on the date of grant"
with '"Fair Market Value' [ ] defined as the closing bid price for
Linear's stock ... on the date the options are granted").3

Not all equity compensation plans require this. For example, in the Desimone
case upon which the Directors and Officers rely (Resp. Br. at 26), the plan

3
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• Plaintiffs alleged that equity awards were granted prior to the release
of positive information that caused the company's stock price to go
up. (R. 12-14); Tyson, 919 A.2d at 576; Weiss, 948 A.2d at 439, 443.
• The grants had exercise prices equal to the trading price on the date
of the grant, and therefore complied with the express terms of the
plan. (R.

11,

13); Tyson, 919 A.2d at 576, 592-93; Weiss, 948 A.2d at

439, 442.
• The grants had various vesting schedules that provided for vesting
over several years. Resp. Br. at 5; Tyson, 919 A.2d at 592 n.75;

Weiss, 948 A.2d at 447.
There is no meaningful difference between the facts of the instant case and
those of the numerous Delaware cases in which courts have declined to dismiss
claims based on allegations of spring-loading equity awards. See Tyson, 919 A.2d
at 592-93; Weiss, 948 A.2d at 443; CytRx Tr. at 39:13-40:2, Larkin Tr. at 69:10-

expressly allowed for the granting of below-market equity awards. Desimone v.
Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 944 (Del. Ch. 2007).
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16.4

Accordingly, this Court should reach the same result as those courts and

reverse the District Court's dismissal of this action.s
CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons and those set forth in his Opening Brief,
Rawcliffe

respectfully

requests

that

the

Court

reverse

the

Amended

Memorandum and the Final Judgment and remand this case to the District Court
for further proceedings.

The Directors' and Officers' contention that Rawcliffe "cherry-picked" the
examples of spring-loading and bullet-dodging alleged in his Complaint, (Resp.
Br. at 17), is patently false because the Complaint identifies each and every equity
grant made by the Compensation Committee between the adoption of the Plan
and the filing of the Complaint, every one of which was timed to take advantage
of market-moving corporate information.

4

s In their Response Brief the Directors and Officers have attempted to introduce
numerous "facts" that purportedly occurred well after the Complaint was filed in
August 2014, including some that purportedly occurred after the motion to
dismiss was decided in March 2015. See, e.g., Resp. Br. at 9 (USANA's sales for
the year ending December 31, 2015); id. at 10 (retirement of Poelman and
McClain in May 2016); id. at 16 (same); id. at 32 (same); id. at 14 (adoption and
approval of new equity incentive plan in May 2015); id. at 20 (same); id. at 17
(purportedly no SSARs granted in year 2015); id. at 17 n. 3 (disclosure regarding
SEC investigation in August 2014 subsequent to filing of Complaint). These
purported facts, some of which contradict USANA's public filings, have no place
in this appeal and the Comt should disregard them in their entirety.
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CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS

3
1

THE COURT:

2

MS.

Good afternoon,

ORMEROD:

3

Honor.

4

plaintiff Timothy Larkin.

5

Mr.

Good afternoon,

Your

Eve Ormerod of Smith Katzenstein on behalf of
With me at counsel table is

Steven Purcell of Levi & Korsinsky.

6

THE COURT:

7

Mr.

Aronstam.

8

MR.

ARONSTAM:

9

counsel.

Honor.

Good afternoon.

Good afternoon,

Your

Brad Aronstam for Advaxis and the individual

10

defendants.

11

from Alston & Bird,

John Jordak.

12

firm,

With Your Honor's permission,

13

mr.

14

behalf of our clients.

With me at counsel table,

Mike Sirkin.

THE COURT:

16

MR.

17

THE COURT:
Mr.

Also with me from my

Jordak will be presenting the motion to dismiss on

15

18

my co-counsel

Very well.

ARONSTAM:

Thank you.

The floor

is yours,

Jordak.

19

Good afternoon.

20

MR.

JORDAK:

Good afternoon,

Your

21

Honor.

22

Alston & bird In Atlanta,

23

defendants in this action as well as the parallel

24

litigation in Federal Court in New Jersey,

As Brad said,

my name is John Jordak from
and we represent the

CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS

where we

4

1

have a motion to dismiss and a motion to stay

2

currently pending.
We're here this afternoon on our

3
4

motion to dismiss.

5

of background about the company or the individual

6

defendants,

7

papers in some detail.

8

jump right into the issues before the Court on our

9

motion.

since I

10

And I

won't go into a great deal

think that's laid out in our
What I'd like to do is

just

We contend that the decision of

11

Advaxis'

compensation committee to award options on

12

March 30th to the board and certain members of

13

management is protected by the business

14

and as a result,

15

and should be dismissed.

16

judgment rule,

the complaint fails to state a claim

The business

judgment rule applies for

17

two reasons:

18

by the stockholders when they approved the 2015 plan

19

at the May 2015 annual meeting;

20

complaint fails to meet the two-part test laid out by

21

this Court in Tyson for overcoming the business

22

judgment rule.

23
24

First,

the options awarded were ratified

So let me first,
talking about ratification.

and,

second,

Your Honor,

the

start by

The contingent grants

CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS

5

1

which were awarded on March 30,

2

stockholders at the annual meeting on May 27,

3

As an initial matter,

4

reqµired to approve both the 2015 plan and ratify the

5

options given by the compensation committee under that

6

plan.

7

Your Honor,

THE COURT:

Well,

8

weren't required,

9

stockholders approved the plan,

10

2015,

were ratified by
2015.

two votes were not

maybe two votes

but how do I know that when
that they were

specifically approving the particular grants?

11

MR.

JORDAK:

Let me read precisely

12

from the 2015 proxy language because I think that's

13

important here,

14

Honor's question.

15
16

and I

think that that answers Your

THE COURT:

You can.

I have read it

rather carefully.

17

MR.

JORDAK:

Okay.

"On March 30,

18

2015,

the Compensation Committee approved contingent

19

grants of stock options to certain individuals,

20

including executive officers and non-employee

21

directors,

22

Plan at the Annual Meeting.

23

the 2015 Plan,

24

effective and will remain outstanding pursuant to

subject to stockholder approval of the 2015
If stockholders approve

these contingent grants will be

CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS
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1

their terms.

2

Plan,

3

forfeited."

If stockholders do not approve the 2015

these contingent grants will be cancelled and

4

So we believe that it could not have

5

been more clear what the stockholders were

6

specifically being asked to approve.

7

provided with all the material information.

8

the exact number of shares that had been awarded in

9

the provisional grants,

They were

they knew who the recipients

10

were,

11

understood the minimum vesting requirements.

they knew the exercise price,

12

They knew

THE COURT:

and they

Here's the issue.

I'm

13

sure you have taken some time to read the Citrix or

14

the Calma opinion.

Right?

15

MR.

16

THE COURT:

17

JORDAK:

Yes.
And,

obviously,

I

spent a

fair amount of time looking at cases in this area.

18

Let's assume,

for

sake of discussion,

19

that ratification requires some meeting of the minds,

20

some meeting of the minds between the company and the

21

plaintiffs.

If I

22

disclosure.

I mean,

23

clear meeting of the minds that if you approve -- if

24

you vote in favor of this,

read that -- or I did read that
there would seem to be a pretty

this plan is approved.

CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS

But

7
1

why does that necessarily mean there was a meeting of

2

the minds on a different question about,

3

these specific grants?

4

MR.

JORDAK:

I think,

We approve

Your Honor,

5

because the language that was included in the proxy

6

goes through in great detail exactly what the

7

shareholders were being asked to approve.

So they

8

were being asked to approve the 2015 plan,

which gave

9

the compensation committee the ability to award

10

options;

and at the same time,

11

to ratify what the compensation committee had done

12

pursuant to that discretion with respect to awarding

13

these options.

14

THE COURT:

All right.

As a matter of

15

logic,

16

scenario where the collective group of stockholders

17

did intend to approve the plan but did not intend to

18

approve the specific awards?

19

though,

they were being asked

would you agree there could be a

MR.
Your Honor,

JORDAK:

I

suppose that that could

20

happen,

but given that the 2015 plan

21

specifically gives the compensation committee the

22

discretion to award these options,

23

little incongruous for a stockholder to approve the

24

plan which gives the compensation committee that

it would seem a

CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS
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1

discretion but then not approve what the compensation

2

committee actually did to exercise that discretion.
THE COURT:

3

Let me also take the flip

4

side.

Let's assume the vote went negative.

5

agree with me that a negative vote could mean,

6

know,

7

didn't like the plan,

8

options,

one of -- I

people

people didn't like the specific

MR.

JORDAK:

Yes.

That could happen,

yes.

11

THE COURT:

12

MR.

13

you

or people didn't like both.

9

10

can think of three things:

Would you

Okay.

JORDAK:

And a no vote would

indicate that.

14

THE COURT:

15

MR.

All right.

JORDAK:

I

believe the Steiner

16

case that we cited in our papers is very instructive

17

here,

18

stockholder approval of an option plan that set forth

19

specific awards effectively ratified the subsequent

20

awards specified therein.

Your Honor .

There,

the Court held that

And as Your Honor stated in the Calma

21

22

case,

when you were citing the Steiner case,

23

the plan approved by stockholders in Steiner was,

24

effect,

self-executing:

you said

it set forth the specific

CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS

"in

9

1

awards to be granted

2

stockholder approval of the plan per force meant

3

stockholder approval of the option awards for which

4

the directors asserted a ratification defense."
And I

5

"In other words,

II

think,

here,

we have a very

6

similar situation.

Approval of the 2015 plan and

7

approval of the March 2015 grants were inextricably

8

intertwined,

9

force meant approval of the March 2015 grants.

and so approval of the 2015 plan per

10

THE COURT:

Remind me.

It's

just not

11

in front of my forehead right now.

12

option grants of directors did that plan provide?

13

Didn't it have,

14

like,
MR.

specific annual --

JORDAK:

It did,

15

had a specific number in the plan.

16

did,

Your Honor.
In Steiner,

It
it

Your Honor.

17
18

What exactly about

THE COURT:

Owe an annual basis,

if I

recall correctly.

19

MR.

JORDAK:

20

Let me address

It did.

It did.

just a few of the

21

plaintiffs'

22

rely on the Santa Fe case,

23

believe is applicable here at all.

24

stockholder voted.

arguments on ratification.

The plaint i ffs

which we would do not
There,

a

The vote to approve a merger at

CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS
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1

issue did not constitute ratification of the board's

2

unilateral decision to erect defensive measures

3

against the bidder's offer because those defensive

4

measures had already worked their effect before the

5

stockholders had a chance to vote.

6

what we have here.

That's not at all

And another of the plaintiffs'

7

Your Honor's case,

cases,

8

the Calma case,

9

that stockholder ratification occurs when a majority
uncoerced,

that simply holds

10

of informed,

and disinterested stockholders

11

vote in favor of a specific decision of the board.

12

Again,

just like what we have here.

13

The plaintiffs also cite the Gantler

14

case,

really,

15

the only conduct that can be ratified is that which

16

the shareholders are specifically asked to approve,

17

which,

18

is exactly what happened here.

again,

for the unremarkable proposition that

based on what we have in the 2015 proxy,

And then,

19

finally,

in Your Honor's

20

case in Cambridge,

which the plaintiffs rely on,

21

there,

22

directors are protected by the business

23

because each award was approved by a disinterested

24

majority of the stockholders.

the Court held that equity awards to outside
judgment rule

The Court focused on

CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS
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1

what was disclosed,

which was basically the same

2

information as we have here,

3

votes were required.
THE COURT:

4

and not whether separate

Actually,

again,

5

a little while since I read it,

6

misremembering this but,

7

approving the specific awards are linked to approving

8

a plan.

first of all,

MR.

JORDAK:

10

THE COURT:

11

MR.
votes.

I don't think

JORDAK:

In Cambridge,

Your Honor?

Yes.
Yes.

There were separate

I will acknowledge that.

13
14

could be

Isn't that right?

9

12

but -- I

it's been

THE COURT:
votes like by person,

15

MR.

And I think even separate

if I remember correctly.

JORDAK:

They were.

But that

16

decision,

which the plaintiffs have argued applies

17

here,

18

that is not an issue that the Court really addressed

19

in the Cambridge case.

that there necessarily must be separate votes,

20

THE COURT:

21

MR.

JORDAK:

Okay.
So as the Delaware

22

Supreme Court held in the Michelson versus Duncan

23

case,

24

stockholders so ratifying are adequately informed of

Your Honor,

ratification is valid if

CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS
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1

the consequences of their acts and the reason

2

therefor.

3

ratification here and that the business

4

applies.

So we contend that there's been

However,

5

Your Honor,

judgment rule

because the

6

complaint fails to meet the two-part test laid out by

7

this Court in Tyson,

8

business

9

becomes the operative standard.

which is required to overcome the

judgment rule in a spring-loading case,
And the burden,

waste
of

10

course,

is on the plaintiff to allege facts that no

11

person of ordinary sound business

12

the consideration for the options was fair.

13

contend that the plaintiffs have not met that standard

14

here.

15

judgment would say
And we

I'd like to now walk through the

16

two-part Tyson test which the plaintiffs must plead in

17

order to overcome the business
THE COURT:

18

judgment rule.

One thing I'm interested

19

to hear is how you conceptualize these two different

20

arguments interrelate,

21

for example,

22

your argument of the defense to a transaction that

23

otherwise would be viewed as self-dealing and governed

24

by entire fairness because the three members of the

if you contend they do.

So,

what we've been discussing up to now is

CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS
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1

compensation committee were approving grants to

2

themselves and,

3

directors,

4

guess there was one guy that got 70,000 instead of

5

20,000.

for that matter,

to their fellow

which presumably would be equivalent

Now you're going into an area,

6

7

where you're not necessarily

8

approving their own options.

9

some of the officers.

I

though,

just talking about them
You're talking about

And I'm just not sure how these

10

two arguments are supposed to work together.

11

could explain that to me,

If you

that would be helpful.

12

MR.

JORDAK:

Sure.

13

The first part of the argument with

14

respect to ratification establishes if the

15

stockholders approve the plan and approve the

16

contingent grants,

17

waste.

18

for the plaintiffs to get out from underneath the

19

business judgment rule that we contend applies,

20

would have to meet the two-part standard in Tyson.

21

then the operative standard here is

The business

judgment rule applies.

In order

So we start with ratification.

22

business judgment rule applies.

23

the Tyson analysis,

24

alleged is the operative --

they

The

Then we move on to

which is what the plaintiffs have

CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS
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THE COURT:

1

2

road,

then,

3

does the second part fit

5

part,

6

Your Honor.

in,

JORDAK:

THE COURT:

Where

the Tyson analysis?
If we lose on the first

then we're under the entire fairness

7

8

what if you lose in the first part?

MR.

4

Before you go down that

All right.

standard,

For

everything?
MR.

9

JORDAK:

It is.

And so the Tyson

10

test wouldn't really apply because the business

11

judgment rule is not applicable.

12

THE COURT:

13

MR.

JORDAK:

Okay.
So let me talk about the

It's a two-part test.

The first part is

14

Tyson test.

15

that the compensation committee had to be in

16

possession of material nonpublic information at the

17

time it issued the options,

18

and the compensation committee had to intend to

19

violate the spirit of the 2015 plan by issuing the

20

options in advance of good news that would make the

21

stock price rise.

22

terms of the plan by issuing what are really below the

23

market price on the day they're issued.

24

in other words,

In other words,

they knew,

they violated the

After the compensation committee
CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS

15
1

awarded the contingent options on March 30th,

2

complaint alleges that three press releases were

3

issued by the company in April 2015 about various

4

developments regarding Advaxis'

5

of its research regarding the same.

6

the

drugs and presentation

In order to meet prong one of the

7

Tyson test,

the complaint must contain well-pled

8

allegations that the compensation committee knew about

9

the content of these press releases at the time it

10

issued the contingent options on March 30th.

11

contend,

12

done that.

13

conclusions about what the compensation committee

14

would or should have known with 20/20 hindsight.

Your Honor,

And we

that the complaint has simply not

The complaint pleads nothing but

Repeatedly uses phrases in the

15
16

opposition such as

17

"would have known,"

18

"would have been aware."

19

asks the reader to take unreasonable inference after

20

unreasonable inference,

21

of the defendants and the contents of what's in the

22

press releases.

23
24

"naturally would have expected,"
"would have been keenly aware,"
The complaint,

focuses

We contend,

in our view,

solely on the titles

Your Honor,

that the

allegations of what we have here are similar to what
CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS
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1

the Court faced in the Desimone case where the Court

2

held that those were inadequate under prong one of the

3

Tyson test.

4

We walked through a little bit of

5

Desimone because I think that's useful to compare to

6

what we've got here.

7

alleged that the board granted options to directors

8

and officers 16 days before the corporation announced

9

positive news that it secured a top position in the

10

So in Desimone,

the plaintiff

European market.

11

The Court dismissed the action and

12

stated that the complaint simply did not allege that

13

any director was aware of the positive information at

14

the time the grants were made and refused to draw such

15

an inference from facts that were pled,

16

positive information was not released until more than

17

two weeks after the grants,

18

in the weeks after the options were granted lacked

19

materiality,

20

not of the type that was certain to send the

21

corporation's stock price soaring.

22

given that the

the information announced

and -- this is an important quote -- were

THE COURT:

Now,

the part of the

23

opinion you're now quoting from and you're relying on,

24

was that governed by Rule 23.1 or 12(b} (6)?
CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS
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1

MR.

2

THE COURT:

23. 1.

JORDAK:

So recognizing that

3

there's a lower standard here,

4

that?
MR.

5

JORDAK:

how do you address

Right.

We understand

6

that the 12 (b) (6)

standard is less than 23 .1,

7

under 12(b) (6)

8

plead more than just conclusions and recite the

9

elements of the claim.

jurisprudence,

but even

the plaintiffs have to

10

The Court in Desimone found that even

11

if the announcement caused a belated short-term spike

12

in the stock price,

13

which the corporation's stock was susceptible,

14

announcement would not have been likely to have had a

15

substantial effect on the stock's trading when the

16

first of the options vested,

17

the options,

18

years.

19

that given the price swings to
the

much less on the bulk of

the last of which did not vest for three

And then finally in Desimone,

before I

20

move into how those compare to what we've got here,

21

the complaint -- the Court criticized the complaint

22

for failing to provide any information about how the

23

company's stock performed on a market-adjusted basis.

24

And so this left the Court with no idea of whether the
CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS
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1

company's swings were correlated with overall market

2

swings or whether they were correlated to actual

3

statements and press releases put out by the company.
And here,

4

Your Honor,

we have very

5

similar allegations,

6

Extreme volatility in the price of Advaxis stock and a

7

three-year vesting of the options.

8

severely undercut any inference of materiality about

9

the April 2015 announcements.

10

as we've laid out in our papers.

We believe these

Let me talk first a little bit about

11

volatility.

There have been several one- or two-day

12

periods in which the stock prices fluctuated more than

13

10 percent since April 1,

14

April 15th,

15

all laid out in Exhibit B to our motion to dismiss,

16

which goes through all the stock prices during the

17

relevant time period.

April 30th,

2015.

That would be on

and September 21st,

18

And if we look again

19

THE COURT:

20

I'm sorry.

What is that

relevant time period?
MR.

21

JORDAK:

The relevant time period

22

would be from March through I

23

April.

24

which are

THE COURT:

guess through the end of

Of 2015?
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MR.

1

JORDAK:

I'm sorry.

The options

2

were issued at the end of March of 2015 and the

3

shareholders approved them at the end of May.
THE COURT:

4

Right.

But what I'm

5

trying to understand is -- there is a separate issue

6

of what I

7

know you've put in some stock price activity.

8

thought you were trying to drive at is that based on

9

volatility prior to these grant issuances,

can look at outside the complaint,

and I
What I

and if

10

there indeed was a lot of volatility,

11

negating an inference that basically this was being

·12

done with the intent to capture value based on the

13

materially positive development they knew about at the

14

time or something to that effect.
So did you put in data predating

15
16

March 30th?

Just remind me.

17
18

MR.

JORDAK:

to look at Exhibit B.

sort of ex post,

22

the volatility,

23

ago,

24

February.

from March.

I'd have

The volatility information

if you will,
MR.

21

I'm not sure.

We put in our stock chart.

THE COURT:

19
20

it would go to

JORDAK:

after the fact,
Yes,

but we also put in

as Your Honor alluded to
I'm sorry.

would --

just a minute

From January and
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THE COURT:

1

just ask you,

so I

Okay.

have it,

All right.

2

me

3

there's some stock information here,

4

March 30th -- that was the grant date.

5

MR.

JORDAK:

6

THE COURT:

7

MR.

So let

to the extent that
like,

after

Right?

It is.
What's its relevance?

JORDAK:

I

think after March 30th,

8

the plaintiffs claim that the stock price going up

9

after the date that the options were issued allegedly

10

shows that we spring-loaded the options.

11

And the point that I

12

to make is that this,

if anything,

13

stock.

14

did in January,

15

months and weeks after March 30th.

think I'm trying

is not a stable

This stock jumps up and down,
February,

16

THE COURT:

17

MR.

up and down.

It

and it did certainly in the

JORDAK:

All right.
So it would be very

18

difficult for anybody on the comp committee to predict

19

what the stock price is going to do in reaction to a

20

press release,

21

the press release,

22

difficult for them to predict what the effect on the

23

market is going to be.

24

even assuming they knew the contents of
or even earlier.

And I

It would be very

think we laid out several
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1

examples in our papers.

2

showed that the stock traded at 13.51 in January,

3

then it was down to 7.44 later in January,

4

dipped down to 7.02 in February.

5

has

For instance,

I think I
and

and then it

So the stock really

just jumped up and down.

6

I think there is another exhibit in

7

our papers that shows that in terms of a graph.

8

That's Exhibit C where you can just see the up and

9

down movement of the stock price.

10

The other important point I'd like to

11

make,

Your Honor,

is that between the date that the

12

stock options were granted on a contingent basis in

13

March and the date of that first press release in

14

April,

15

on no news at all.

the stock price had already risen 20 percent,

16

So for the plaintiffs to claim that

17

somehow we were spring-loading these options,

18

knew information back in the end of March when we

19

granted the options,

20

hang together.

21

that we

the story just doesn't really

Additionally,

Your Honor,

the

22

three-year vesting applicable to a majority of the

23

options would require that the information in the

24

April 15th releases be so material as to sustain an
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1

increase in the company's stock price for 36 months.

2

And,

3

of this stock price would make that almost impossible.

again,

as I've just discussed,

4

And then,

finally,

the ups and downs

as the Court

5

observed in Desimone,

6

with respect to how the company's stock performed on a

7

market-adjusted basis.

8

indices rose between April 7th and April 10th and

9

between April 20th and April 27th.

10

the complaint alleges nothing

And,

in fact,

the NASDAQ

The plaintiffs rely on the Tyson case.

11

However,

12

different than what we've got here.

13

got the sale of a division,

14

of a $3.2 billion acquisition,

15

company's earnings beating estimates.

16

different from the three April announcements that

17

we've got here.

18

the allegations in there were far,

far

In Tyson,

you've

you've got the canceling
and you've got the
Far,

far

And just to remind the Court,

with

19

respect to the three April announcements,

20

the collaboration with a trial operator,

21

a Phase 1/2 clinical trial,

and the interim results of

22

a preclinical study.

very different from what

23

was alleged in Tyson.

24

Very,

those were
enrollment in

So moving on to prong two of the Tyson
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test which the plaintiffs must meet to overcome the

2

business judgment rule,

3

well-pled allegations that the compensation committee

4

intended to violate the spirit of the 2015 plan by

5

issuing options in advance of good news that would

6

make the stock price rise.

7

prong,

8

second prong.

the complaint must contain

And as with the first

we contend that the complaint has not met the

I think that the hypothetical,

9

and we

10

quoted this in our papers,

11

Strine in the Desimone case is very useful.

12

just read that.

13

approved by the stockholders expressly required grants

14

to be made at fair market value

15

disclosures to the stockholders in advance of the

16

approval vote made clear that the stock option plan

17

was,

18

corporation to reward outstanding performance and to

19

create incentives for superior future efforts.

20

the carefully-crafted test articulated by the

21

Chancellor in Tyson,

22

give rise to anything other than an excess

23

compensation claim,

24

that the defendants acted in a deceptive manner

"Assume

given by Vice Chancellor
Let me

the stock option plan

subject to qualification,

In fact,

the

intended to permit the

Under

these facts would arguably not

as it would be difficult to find
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intended to circumvent the purposes of a

2

stockholder-approved stock option plan."

3

So here,

Your Honor,

the plan has a

4

dual purpose,

just like in that hypothetical in

5

Desimone,

6

talent.

7

which undermines any argument about an intent to

8

circumvent the plan.

9

immediately.

to compensate and incentivize/attract new
We also have a three-year vesting schedule,

The board's grants did not vest

They were under a three-year vesting

10

schedule.

11

vested immediately,

12

No one has exercised any options,

13

$13 million in secret profits,

14

claim.

15

strike price now and has been for many,

Only one-quarter of the officers'

options

and those were from a prior plan
and so there is no

as the plaintiffs

And the stock price is trading below the

16

many months.

The market has reacted erratically to

17

previous announcements,

18

compensation committee on March 30th to predict how it

19

would react in the coming weeks.

20

March 16,

21

about preliminary data from a Phase 1/2 clinical study

22

of one of its cancer treatments.

23

opened at 13.48,

24

further the next day at 12.41.

2015,

and there was no way for the

We cited that on

the company put out a press release

The stock price

closed down at 13.01,
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Similarly,

on March 19,

2015,

the

2

company put out a press release announcing that the

3

first patient had been dosed in a Phase 1/2 clinical

4

trial evaluating one of the company's immunotherapies.

5

The stock price opened at 11.90,

6

and closed down the following day,

7

11.82.

8

9

closed at

trading as low as

And even in the opposition,
plaintiff admits,

just 12.40,

and I'm quoting here,

the

"Here,

the

10

defendants could not have known about future movement

11

of the company's stock."

12

to infer any intent here.

13

Again,

So i t ' s simply unreasonable

the cases the plaintiffs cite,

14

the Weiss case,

the Tyson case,

very,

15

facts alleged.

The Weiss case,

you had 22 separate

16

option grants over a ten-year period that were granted

17

shortly before earnings were going to be announced.

18

And in the Tyson case,

19

committee had a four-year practice of granting options

20

just days before material announcements,

21

sale of a division,

22

a competitor,

23
24

as I

very different

said before,

the comp

such as the

the cancellation of a deal to buy

and earnings releases.
So,

in sum,

Your Honor,

the complaint

fails to meet either prong of the Tyson test,
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1

contend that the business

judgment rule continues to

2

apply to the comp committee's decision to issue the

3

March 2015 options.
Let me move on to the recipient

4
5

defendants.

The plaintiffs have a claim against the

6

recipient defendants that they breached their

7

fiduciary duty by accepting the grants.
THE COURT:

8
9

definitionally,

Let's

just see if,

I'm thinking of the same thing.

When

10

you use the term "recipient defendants" right now,

11

are you defining it?

12
13

MR.

They are -- I ' l l tell

JORDAK:

you.
THE COURT:

14

15

I

assume it includes the

four officers who are not directors.

16

MR.

17

So it includes Ms.
the CFO;

Dr.

19

COO;

McKearn;

20

Dr.

21

chief scientific officer.

22

defendants.

24

Dr.

Patton;

Khleif;

JORDAK:

18

23

how

Dr.

It does.

Mauro;

Dan O'Connor,

and Dr.

Petit,

THE COURT:

Is that right?

Bonstein,

Greg Mayes,

who is
who is the

who is the CEO;

who is the EVP and the
Those are the recipient

All right.

So the

universe is the four directors who were not on the
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comp committee,

2

plus the four nondirector officers.

3

MR.

4

one of whom is an insider,

JORDAK:

O'Connor,

Is that right?

I believe that's right,

yes.

5

THE COURT:

6

MR.

JORDAK:

All right.
So we contend that the

7

recipient defendants did not breach any fiduciary duty

8

by accepting the grants.
First,

9

there can be no breach

10

because

based on the acceptance,

11

already demonstrated,

12

granted and ratified.

13

defendants did not know that the options violated the

14

2015 plan.

15

since,

as we have

the options were properly
Furthermore,

the recipient

As the plaintiffs have done throughout

16

the complaint,

17

memberships on committees,

18

knowledge,

19

several cases in our brief that have held that.

20

can't simply say because somebody holds a position or

21

sits on a committee without anything else that they're

22

presumed to have knowledge.

case.

and then presumed

which just isn't enough.

Again,

23

24

they only allege corporate positions,

And we've cited
You

the plaintiffs cite the Weiss

We contend the facts there are very different.
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And the Pfeiffer case,

where the options grant

2

exceeded the caps in a

single year.

3

with very,

4

contend that the recipient defendants did not breach

5

any fiduciary duty by accepting the grants.

very different factual

6

And then,

Those cases dealt

situations.

finally,

So we

the last part of

7

Count I

is the nonemployee directors did not breach

8

any fiduciary duties of loyalty by granting excessive

9

compensation.

First,

we start with the business

10

judgment rule protects the nonemployee direct6rs'

11

decisions.

12

then the decision to grant the award should not be

13

second-guessed.

14

rule applies because you got meaningful limits baked

15

into the 2015 plan.

16

17

If the 2015 plan has meaningful limits,

In other words,

THE COURT:

the business

judgment

The limit here for outside

directors is like over $4 million per director?

18

MR.

JORDAK:

Well,

that would assume

19

that you're calculating the number based on how the

20

plaintiffs did in their papers.

21

multiply -- assumes that all the options vested on the

22

date that they were ratified at that price of $22.

23

course,

24

been in the money for

That assumes that you

Of

they vest over a three-year period and haven't
some time.

So that's how the
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plaintiffs come up with that number.
THE COURT:

2

3

Under the 2015 plan,
MR.

4

5

Let me ask it differently.

is there a per-director limit?
JORDAK:

There is.

shares.
THE COURT:

6

And at the time the plan

7

was adopted -- is that for RSUs,

8

is that for?
MR.

9

10

JORDAK:

options,

both?

I believe that's

What

just for

stock awards.

11

THE COURT:

12

MR.

13

200,000

RSUs or SARs,

Well --

JORDAK:

I don't believe it's for

but I would have to double-check that.

14

The other meaningful limit is a share

15

cap of 3.6 million under the plan,

16

vesting requirement,

17

exercise price,

18

market value on the grant date.

19

and,

three-year minimum

of course,

that the price,

is equal to or greater than the fair

The plaintiffs cite cases that,

again,

20

have wildly different factual allegations:

21

case,

22

that there was no ceiling on what could be awarded,

23

and the Seinfeld case,

24

receive up to $20 million.

which is an RSU case,

the Calma

where Your Honor found

where each director could
And we would argue that
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those are different situations than what we've had

2

here that;

3

meaningful limit.

that in those cases,

there really was no

The plaintiffs also refer to this Cook

4
5

report.

We spent some time in our brief explaining

6

how they

just basically cherry-picked the portions of

7

that that they liked.

8

reasoning for why the Cook report really is not

9

applicable here.

10

They didn't give a full

It's really an apples and oranges

comparison.

11

The complaint does make some

12

references to RSUs but really never elaborates

13

further.

14

were spring-loaded.

15

RSUs.

16

spring-loading is irrelevant here.

I don't think they're claiming that the RSUs
You really can't spring-load

So we would argue that the reference to the

And then,

17

finally,

18

two remaining claims,

19

and an unjust enrichment claim.

21

Before you go there,

let

me go back.

22

MR.

23

THE COURT:

24

for the

there's a proxy disclosure claim

THE COURT:

20

Your Honor,

JORDAK:

Sure.
The grants that the

compensation committee made to the officers,
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other directors,

2

that right?

they were also on March 30th.

3

MR.

4

THE COURT:

JORDAK:

Yes,

Is

Your Honor.

And were they subjected or

5

were they -- I

think the answer is no but I

just want

6

to be sure.

7

seeking shareholder approval of the 2015 plan?

Were they discussed in the context of

8

MR.

JORDAK:

9

THE COURT:

I believe they were.
And similar to what it

10

said about the directors,

11

you didn't approve the plan,

12

get -- I guess,

13

insofar as the officers received grants under the 2015

14

plan.

15
16

just logically,

MR . JORDAK:

THE COURT:

The ones

My inference is that they

used up the rest of the 2011 plan.
MR.

22

THE COURT:

24

That's correct.

that vested immediately were under the 2011 plan.

21

23

that had to happen

Right?

19
20

the officers wouldn't

Some were also under the 2011 plan.

17
18

did the proxy state that if

JORDAK:

They did.
Needed something to work

with.
So,

I'm sorry,

in terms of the
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question I had,

MR.

2

3

JORDAK:

THE COURT:

I'm looking here

Where are you looking,

just so I can try to find it?

6

MR.

7

THE COURT:

8

Yeah.

now at the proxy.

4

5

though --

JORDAK:

Page 11.
Okay.

Let me see the

proxy here.
MR.

9

JORDAK:

And I

believe what

10

they've done there is they've listed out the -- no,

11

they do list them individually.

12

THE COURT:

13

I

see a page for O'Connor,

14

three.
MR.

15

16

JORDAK:

I

see -- yeah,

Petit and Mayes,

those

And then they've got all

executive nondirectors as a group.

17

THE COURT:

18

MR.

19

THE COURT:

20

All right.

JORDAK:

Right.
Which is 170,000.
Just bear with me a

second.

21

MR.

JORDAK:

22

THE COURT:

Sure.
Can you show me what part

23

of the proxy indicates that each outside director is

24

getting 20,000 except for one person who I
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70, 000?

2
3

MR.

JORDAK:

I'm not able to put my

finger on that right now.
THE COURT:

4

All right.

Maybe you and

5

your colleagues can look for that while Mr.

6

making argument.
MR.

7

8

up briefly,

JORDAK:

Okay.

Let me

Purcell is

just finish

Your Honor.
THE COURT:

9

MR.

10

JORDAK:

All right.
Again,

the two remaining

11

claims are the disclosure claim and the unjust

12

enrichment claim.

13

With respect to the disclosure claim,

14

I

think the plaintiffs do not dispute what was

15

actually disclosed in the proxy.

16

claiming that we failed to disclose that we breached

17

our fiduciary duties by failing to disclose that we

18

spring-loaded the options.

19

accusing us of failing to engage in self-flagellation.

20

And we have cited several cases in our papers that we

21

are under no obligation to do that.

22

And again,

23

cite Weiss.

24

the defendants,

So,

in essence,

they're

they cite Tyson II.

But in those cases,
in fact,

They're only

They

the Court held that

did spring-load the options
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at issue.

2

And then for the unjust enrichment

3

claim,

again,

if the breach of fiduciary duty claim

4

falls,

which we submit that it should,

5

enrichment claim should fail as well.

6

THE COURT:

7

MR.

8

THE COURT:

9

MR.

10

then the unjust

Thank you.

All right.

JORDAK:

Thank you,
Mr.

PURCELL:

Your Honor.

Purcell.

Good afternoon,

Your

Honor.

11

THE COURT:

Good afternoon.

12

MR . PURCELL:

As defense counsel

13

indicated,

14

arguments in an attempt to dismiss the plaintiffs'

15

claims,

16

argument is an alleged failure to sufficiently allege

17

a spring-loading scheme under Tyson and its progeny.

18

the defendants have made two primary

one of which is ratification,

Now,

and the other

with respect to ratification,

I

19

was looking over the briefs in preparation for the

20

hearing.

21

their motion to dismiss,

22

whether or not the defendants were actually making any

23

ratification defense at all.

24

I was reminded of my initial reaction to
which was uncertainty as to

Of course,

ratification is an
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affirmative defense that the defendants have the

2

burden of establishing.

3

discussion,

4

defendants had failed to establish that defense for

5

reasons that I think apply a fortiori here,

6

get to that.

And in Your Honor's Citrix

in that case,

it was clear that the

But in their opening brief,

7

and I will

they

8

actually really don't have any argument about

9

ratification,

per se.

The term I believe shows up a

10

couple of times but in the context of quotations from

11

cases.

12

approved this,

13

the plan because we disclosed it.

What they say is that the shareholders
and they approved it when they approved

And in addressing their arguments,

14

we

15

wanted to be sure that to the extent they were making

16

a ratification defense,

17

defense did not apply and they hadn't carried their

18

burden on that defense,

we were going to show why that

so we addressed it.

And then on reply,

19

it's front and

They have eight pages on it,

and they cite

20

center.

21

all of the cases.

22

they don't cite the Calma or the Citrix case until

23

almost the last page of their brief and only with

24

respect to an argument about the relationship between

I think in their opening brief,
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an unjust enrichment claim and a breach of fiduciary

2

duty claim in this context.
In any event,

3

I think,

based on Your

4

Honor's very thorough historical discussion of the

5

ratification concept,

6

the context of these shareholder-approved compensation

7

plans,

8

ratification here.

particularly as it applies in

that there's absolutely no way there was

9

And if you go back to the proxy,

10

counsel wants to rely,

11

language in the proxy which is in their brief and Your

12

Honor said you had read it carefully.

13

"ratify" is only used in the proxy for something that

14

has nothing to do with any of this,

15

public accountants.

16

I

think,

exclusively on the

The word

which is the

There were three votes that were in

17

the 2015 proxy,

and one was for the election of

18

directors,

19

and the third was ratification of the public

20

accountants.

21

necessarily be dispositive,

22

appear at all when discussing the 2015 plan.

23

they say is that the grants that were made under this

24

2015 plan were contingent on shareholder approval of

another was for approval of this 2015 plan,

Ratification -- not that this would
but ratification does not
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the plan.

2

I think there is a very important

3

distinction to be made here,

4

that were discussed in Your Honor's Citrix opinion.

5

think there's a major fundamental difference between

6

asking shareholders to approve something and telling

7

them the board's position as to the consequence of

8

approving something.

9

and it ties into concepts

They never asked shareholders to

10

approve these awards.

11

shareholders,

12

rightly,

13

if you don't approve the 2015 plan,

14

nullity.

15

under the 2015 plan and they asked shareholders to

16

vote on it.

17

shareholders to ratify these awards,

18

ever occurred.

19

I

I

And what they told

think as Your Honor alluded to

was somewhat of a tautology because they say

Well,

the awards are a
They issued them

of course they are.

At no point did they ever ask
and no such vote

And it is not enough under the case

20

law that all of the information relating to the grants

21

was in the proxy,

22

think all of the information as it relates to the

23

nonemployee directors specifically is in the proxy.

24

believe that the only explanation as to what those

even if it was.

I actually don't
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1

awards were for is in the Form 4 filings,

2

indicate that these were awards related to board and

3

committee service.
In any event,

4

which

even if they fully

5

disclosed everything about the options that were

6

granted to each specific individual,

7

ratification here.
As Your Honor noted in the Cambridge

8

9

there is not a

or the Bosnjak case,

that decision does not

10

specifically address whether or not two separate votes

11

would necessarily be required in a context that's

12

similar to this,

13

were attacked by the plaintiffs in that case were in

14

fact ratified,

15

the awards were set forth in separate proposals for

16

the individuals in question and the shareholders voted

17

as to each separate proposal.

18

or tying together of a plan or a plan amendment with

19

awards that were granted underneath them,

but in finding that the awards that

Your Honor noted in the opinion that

There was no bundling

I

think.

It's a fundamental distinction for

20

There's actually more than one action

21

this reason:

22

taking place with respect to the 2015 plan and the

23

awards that the board made under it.

24

one thing.
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And I think the distinction that was

2

discussed I believe initially in the 3Com case and

3

then in Your Honor's opinion in some other cases as

4

well was the distinction between awards that more or

5

less accrue to individuals in a self-enforcing way

6

under a plan that stockholders approved versus an

7

independent and unilateral decision of a board to

8

grant awards underneath a general compensation plan.

9

And this is not a situation and the

10

defendants have really not even made the argument that

11

this was an accrual of awards to defendants in a

12

self-enforcing way under a plan that was approved.

13

There's two separate things.

14

adoption of the plan,

15

approve,

16

decided to grant under this new plan.

17

And I

There is

which they asked shareholders to

and then there is the awards that the board

think that the issue as to why

18

the board made those grants at the time that they did

19

is significant but i t ' s not significant for

20

ratification purposes.

21

second part of our case,

22

part of the case.

23

24

It's really significant to the
which is the spring-loading

And Your Honor had asked Mr.

Jordak

about the interrelationship between the arguments they
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have made in their briefs,

2

the ratification arguments.

3

I

4

their motion because it wasn't clear they were making

5

a ratification defense.

indicated,

the Tyson arguments,
And,

you know,

a question about this when I

And I

6

think,

7

his view,

8

is an entire fairness case.

9

dismiss stage,

versus

I had,

as

first saw

as counsel conceded,

that if the ratification defense fails,

in
this

And at the motion to

to say the least,

the defendants are

10

really going to be going uphill because --

11

technically,

12

know it from the weather outside.

13

analogy,

14

the business

15

stockholder plaintiff steps into the box against the

16

business

17

going to hit for a low average at best,

18

is entire fairness in that same context,

19

the opposite.

20

shape in terms of what he needs to plead to survive

21

the motion.

24

although you wouldn't
To use a baseball

the defendants were doing their best to get
judgment rule on the mound because when a

judgment rule on a motion to dismiss,

he's

whereas if it
it's exactly

The plaintiff is going to be in good

THE COURT:

22

23

this is spring,

So let me break this down

a little bit.
Let's focus on the decision to grant
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the options to the officer defendants,

2

understand there are five of them.

3

Mr.

4

Obviously,

5

magnitude is a better word,

6

is very different than for outside directors.

7

spring-loading concept to the side for a moment.

8

you arguing,

9

compensation was excessive?

10

O'Connor,

the scope of consideration,

MR.

PURCELL:

Are

that that

Not to the outside

That the compensation to

the --

14

MR.

PURCELL:

Officer directors.
-- the so-called

recipient defendants --

16

THE COURT:

17

recipient defendants,

18

defined it,

Well,

I

think the

at least as the defendants have

includes some directors too.

19

MR.

20

THE COURT:

22

Put the

directors.

THE COURT:

21

or the

of consideration to them

independent of that,

13

15

One is a director.

and four who are not directors.

11
12

which I

PURCELL:

Yeah.
I'm just focusing on the

five officers.
MR.

PURCELL:

No.

What we allege with

23

respect to those defendants is that they were granted

24

stock opt ions that were spr ing-1 oaded,
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that were manipulated in a manner that was designed to

2

shortchange the company and benefit the recipients

3

with respect to those options.
THE COURT:

4

Okay.

Let's assume,

So let me ask you a
you know,

you

5

question about it.

6

haven't stated a claim for spring-loading,

7

hypothetically.

8

compensation committee in approving the compensation

9

for the officers,

just

Why wouldn't the decision of the

just the officers now,

judgment?

be classic

Board members are deciding what

10

business

11

the compensation of the management of the company

12

should be.
MR.

13

PURCELL:

Your Honor,

I

think the

14

answer to that lies in the quid pro quo concept that

15

is discussed not in any of our briefs,

16

not appear to me to be an issue.

17

situation,

18

because you have a large irregular grant of stock

19

options that we submit for various reasons was made

20

at,

21

time,

22

directors themselves,

23

equation,

24

the company,

because it did

But in this

the plaintiffs' position would be that

at the very least,

a highly suspicious point in

and the options were granted not only to the
and we include the CEO in that

but to the highest level of management at
and
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1

THE COURT:

2

MR.

What's the quid pro quo?

PURCELL:

Well,

the directors get

3

their extra options because they had already been

4

compensated for the fiscal year of 2015.
THE COURT:

5

6

Right.

management's help to do that?

7

MR.

PURCELL:

Why did they need

They just could do it.
Well,

Your Honor,

they

8

would need information from management as to what was

9

going on at the company.

10

THE COURT:

11

MR.

12

Why?

PURCELL:

Well,

in order to time

the options as part of the spring-loading scheme.

13

THE COURT:

14

spring-loading theory,

15

manipulation,

16

said,

which,

That's getting into your

if you think there is a

obviously,

you do.

But like I

just put spring-loading aside.

17

MR.

PURCELL:

Yes.

Putting that aside,

You're absolutely

18

correct.

19

theory,

20

appear to be an issue,

21

correct that if you put that entirely to one side,

22

then there would be no separate issue as to that.

which,

23

24

again,

wasn't briefed because it didn't
but Your Honor is absolutely

THE COURT:
clear on this,

because the whole

Right.

So just to be real

so if I put spring-loading to the side
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1

and I'm looking at the officer grants that the company

2

made,

that's business

judgment,

3

MR.

PURCELL:

4

THE COURT:

isn't it?

Correct.
Okay.

Now,

talk to me

5

about -- again,

6

talk about the three directors who weren't on the comp

7

committee.

Tell me your theory there.
MR.

8

9

put spring-loading aside and let's

PURCELL:

Your Honor,

think

that's entire fairness.

10

THE COURT:

11

MR.

PURCELL:

All right.
Under the same reasoning

12

that was discussed in your Citrix opinion.

13

THE COURT:

14

MR.

15

I

PURCELL:

Okay.
Now,

moving on to the

Tyson arguments

16

THE COURT:

Before you do that,

17

just -- I think I have one more question here.

18

just see if I

Let me

can figure out what it was.
Well,

19

20

let me

go ahead.

I can follow up in

the context of your spring-loading argument.

21

MR.

PURCELL:

Okay.

Moving on to the

22

Tyson arguments that the defendants have made,

23

that it is critical to keep in mind that this is a

24

12 (b) (6)

motion,

I think

which sort of gets at your previous
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1

question,

2

that has been made,

3

analysis,

4

12(b)(6).

5

because there is no demand futility argument

which,

so we're not doing a 23.1

of course,

is a much higher bar than

Under 12(b) (6),

we're talking about

6

whether or not the plaintiffs'

7

have stated a cognizable claim of a recoverable injury

8

under any reasonably conceivable set of circumstances

9

that are susceptible to proof,

10
11

well-pled allegations

based on what the

plaintiff has alleged.
And the case law that the defendants

12

rely on is primarily I

13

distinguishable for a number of reasons that we

14

discussed in our brief,

15

standard to a 12(b)(6)

16

change the lens through which Your Honor will view

17

these allegations.

18

why we think that's inappropriate.

19

think Desimone,

which is

but it's applying the 23.1
motion.

So it's attempting to

And we've explained in our brief

Aside from that but related to it is

20

the fact that the defendants want to rely on all sorts

21

of things that aren't in the complaint.

And their

22

goal in doing that is to try to

and I

think they're

23

very frank about this intention

they're trying to

24

undercut the strength of inference that flows
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1

otherwise from plaintiffs' well-pled allegations that

2

spring-loading occurred.

3

to historical stock option grants,

purported

4

volatility of the company's stock,

and the like.

And they do that by pointing

5

What struck me when I

6

arguments is how similar they are to Tyson and Weiss,

7

where those same arguments were made and they were

8

rejected.

9

Court to decide those sorts of factual matters.

10

On a 12(b) (6),

saw those

it's inappropriate for the
The

plaintiff is the master of his own complaint.
I think on the well-pled allegations

11
12

of this particular complaint,

13

sufficiently for 12 (b) (6)

14

scheme.

we have alleged

purposes a spring-loading

And with respect to that,

15

the

16

defendants have said we have nothing but conclusions

17

in our complaint.

18

we have very specific allegations about who these

19

people are because that's very important,

20

people are.

21

grant of stock options to low-level employees.

22

are the directors and the most senior people that are

23

running the company on a day-to-day basis.

24

It's absolutely not true.

I mean,

who the

This is not a case where you have a huge
These

The other thing is the nature of the
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1

information.

That's also important.

2

it's important is because when you combine who the

3

people are,

4

determines the reasonableness of the inference that

5

flows from the allegations in terms of whether or not

6

it's reasonably conceivable on these set of facts that

7

the board engaged in spring-loading.

what the information is about,

8
9

And the reason

it

And we described the three disclosures
that remained immediately after this unusual stock
Again,

directors had already been paid for

10

grant.

11

2015.

12

defendants the language they used at the time,

13

this is a significant milestone.

14

study.

We described those press releases and we quote

15

that

This is a pivotal

And then there was some positive
Those first two

16

and that's within a week.

17

announcements are within a week of the stock grant.

18

And the other one is a couple of weeks later,

19

was at a conference where one of the defendants

20

presented some very positive data about,

21

the company's three most significant products.

22

is what they do.

23

important to them as a company.

24

but it

again,

one of
This

These products are the most

And the thing that defendants entirely
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1

left out,

at least in the oral argument today,

2

offering of shares that occurred at the tail end of

3

this whole process.

4

plaintiffs'

5

that has been told in the complaint.

6

extent we've made well-pleaded allegations,

7

be accepted as true on 12(b) (6).

And this was central to the

allegations because it's part of the story

8
9

is the

And to the
those must

You look at this offering which
occurred at the end of April,

about a month after this

10

unusual grant of stock options.

11

when the stock was $13.44.

12

end of the period where they have made these

13

announcements,

14

they've released all this good news in the interim.

15

The options were made

By the time you get to the

you have a 64 percent increase because

THE COURT:

just be a little

16

more precise about it.

17

you're telling my that by April 21st,

18

date of the third announcement,

19

64 percent over what it was on March 30th?

20
21

MR.
calculation right,

22

I

So let me

saw the 64 percent.

PURCELL:

So

which is the

the price was up

If we got our

it is.

THE COURT:

23

I'm a billionaire if I

24

correctly.

That's like me telling you

added up my bank account
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1

MR.

PURCELL:

2

time,

I don't know that,

3

make that calculation and I

4

believe it's wrong,

5

question,

I

Independently,

at this

but we did look at it and
stand by it.

I don't

but the way Your Honor asked the

just wanted to be careful.
THE COURT:

6

Okay.

which is,

So would the

7

following be correct,

your complaint doesn't

8

allege facts that the compensation committee members

9

knew as of March 30th of the events that were the

10

specific subjects of the press releases on April 6th,

11

8th and 21st,

12

proximity to March 30th that they must have known.

13

Is that a fair characterization or

14

would you state it differently?

15
16

but you're asking me to infer from their

MR.

PURCELL:

Could I get that again?

Sorry,

Your Honor.

Because I want to make sure.

17

THE COURT:

18

There are not facts in the complaint

Sure.

19

that the directors who were on the compensation

20

committee and made the awards on March 30th actually

21

knew -- you don't have facts

22

on March 30th of any of the events in the April 6th,

23

8th,

24

or 21st press releases.
MR.

PURCELL:

that they actually knew

Is that right?
We do not -- we allege

CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS

50
1

that as a conclusion that is based on a different set

2

of facts,

3

don't think we have to allege at this point that they

4

knew .

but we do not allege that they knew and I

We certainly don't have to show that they knew.
Under 12 (b) (6),

5

what we need to do is

6

offer a set of allegations that,

7

satisfies Rule 12 (b)

8

done that.

(6).

And I

THE COURT:

9

accepted as true,
think that we have

Okay.

Summarize,

10

in a nutshell what those allegations are.

11

you're including in that the fact that,

12

previously had received this.

13

fiscal year ends October 31 or something?

14

MR.

PURCELL:

15

THE COURT:

I

though,
presume

you know,

they

The calendar year or

Yes,

or November 1st.

And they had already

16

received sort of a set of grants for the prior fiscal

17

year .

18

getting another slug of awards.

Now i t ' s only five months later,

19

MR.

PURCELL:

20

THE COURT:

and they're

That's one fact.

Right.
Another fact,

I

guess,

21

would be the closeness in time between March 30th and

22

the dates

23

you would draw from that.

24

the amounts,

MR.

and it's in the inference

PURCELL:

Right.
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1

director compensation policy that they disclosed that

2

clearly says that the directors get their compensation

3

at the beginning of the fiscal year.

4

$100,000 annually,

5

of which needs to consist of equity.

7

in a minute,

8

that you think,

9

12 (b) (6)

10

I think it says at least 50 percent

THE COURT:

6

but

And it's

I want you to show me that

just finish the list of your facts
in a nutshell,

support you meeting the

standard that they had material inside

information when they made the grants.
MR.

11

PURCELL:

Sure.

I want to

12

actually start with what I was talking about a couple

13

minutes ago,

14

company had disclosed no later than January that they

15

were going to need to raise financing in order to

16

continue operations.

17

inference that,

18

the nature of the financing and all of its meetings

19

that companies have to have with bankers about what's

20

going on at the company,

21

discussions about the timing of not only the offering

22

but anything that's going on in the meantime,

23

including all of positive news that was released in

24

April,

which,

which is the public offering.

And I

The

think it's a reasonable

based on that disclosure and based on

in fact,

that there were going to be

is described in the prospectus
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1

supplement through which they offered the shares.

2

But,

3

the fact that when they sat down to do this,

4

recognized they didn't have enough capacity under the

5

2011 plan so they adopted a new plan,

actually,

at least equally important,

there is
they

the 2015 plan.

And rather than wait until the

6

7

shareholder meeting,

which was coming up soon -- I

8

think it was imminent at that point in time -- they

9

went ahead and granted these awards and made them

10

contingent on stockholder approval.

11

explanation in the company's filings or in any of the

12

defendants'

13

wait until after the annual meeting occurred and the

14

shareholders had approved the plan.

15

There's been no

briefing as to why they did not simply

We have alleged in our complaint that

16

they didn't wait because they wanted to spring-load

17

the options.

18

who the people are,

19

think there was a 10-Q or a 10-K that actually

20

described these three products as the company's

21

leading product candidates.

22

that the people running the company were focused on in

23

their day-to-day business.

24

And when you combine that,

again,

with

the nature of the disclosures -- I

So these were the things

With respect to the role of the
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1

compensation committee in compensating the executive

2

officers through these grants and otherwise,

3

status of these products,

4

ones to the company,

5

critical factor.

6

the

the three most important

was obviously going to be a

In addition,

many of these defendants

7

are quoted in the press release.

8

tried to dismiss these allegations on the basis that

9

this is

The defendants have

just chest-thumping puffery.

Well,

look at

10

what they've said.

11

to characterize it now.

12

favorable terms about all this stuff and the stock

13

price went up a lot.

14

defendants were on the research and development

15

committee responsible for monitoring scientific

16

developments at the company and informing the board

17

about it.

18

And of course that's how they want

So I

But they spoke in highly

And a number of these other

think when you combine all of

19

that,

it's clear that under the law,

in particular,

20

most recently in the Sanchez opinion from the Supreme

21

Court,

22

a holistic basis.

23

one by one,

24

brief,

you look at the facts that have been alleged on
We're not looking at these things

as the defendants try to do in their

and try to dismiss them,

because there is a
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1

narrative.

There's a narrative that's been told

2

through well-pled allegations.

3

is it enough?

4

12 (b) (6)

And the question is,

Is it heavy enough?

motion,

think on a

it absolutely is.
THE COURT:

5

And I

All right.

So as I

said a

I wanted you to show me this compensation

6

moment ago,

7

policy manual,

8

that has the 100,000 amount.

9

sound like it's a 100,000 cap.

whatever it is you were referring to,

10

some debate about that.

11

where that language is .
MR.

12

Because you're making it
I thought there was

So if you can just show me

PURCELL:

Yeah.

Let me see.

13

want to -- actually,

14

allegation is.

15

question.

16

to try to clarify what the allegation is.

I

I

let me clarify what the

It won't necessarily moot Your Honor's

want to try to answer anyway,

17

THE COURT:

18

MR.

PURCELL:

but I want

Right.
It is not that there was

The point is that the policy indicated that

19

a cap.

20

the directors were going to get an annual award of

21

compensation at the beginning of the fiscal year,

22

that's what happened.

23

months after that,

24

they're getting all these extra awards,

And so when you have,

a situation where,
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1

getting options,

they're getting RSUs,

as a

2

shareholder,

3

to enforce it,

4

this to say it was once a year and it was a cap and

5

you violated it.

you're not holding up a policy and trying
saying,

6

you know,

Look,

we're reading

That's not the point.
The point is that the fact that they

7

already got paid for that fiscal year under their

8

policy,

9

directors receiving the options themselves,

coupled with the timing of the grant and the

10

the suspect nature of the overall grant.

11

another item.

12

specific policy.

13

necessarily constituted a cap on the comp.

14

THE COURT:

15

MR.

16

THE COURT:

document.
MR.

So where is it?

PURCELL:

18

THE COURT:

22

MR.
that I

24

the complaint.

the

The company's proxy
2013.
Which exhibit?

PURCELL:

have -- Exhibit G,

saw it quoted in the

saw it in the record,

PURCELL:

21

Let me see.
So I

statement filed on April 30,

23

just

We're not contending that it

briefs but I'm not sure I

20

So i t ' s

We're not trying to enforce any

17

19

adds to

Actually,

I don't know

and this is paragraph 51 of
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THE COURT:

1

2

MR.

PURCELL:

I don't,

offhand.

I'm

going to look at it now.

5

It is on page 38.

6

THE COURT:

7

So,

now,

8

wanted to get to next,

9

my mind.

10

Do you know where

in G it is?

3
4

Okay.

Thank you.

I don't know what point you

but here's a question that's on
I guess I want to know this

Let's assume

both ways.

All right.

Let's take it this way first.
Let's assume you got enough to get by

11

12(b)

13

to assert that against the three directors on the comp

14

committee that made these decisions.

15

the recipients stay in,

16

that?

17

who weren't on the comp committee as well as the five

18

officers.

(6)

on your spring-loading claim.

It's one thing

12

Right?

Why do

even if you're right about

And now I'm referring to the three directors

MR.

19

PURCELL:

Your Honor,

I think that

20

the reason that they would stay in at this point is

21

that the same allegations that go to establishing a

22

basis for reasonable inference under 12 (b) (6)

23

the compensation committee defendants applies to them

24

as well.

Admittedly,

not to the same degree.

CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS

as to

But the

57
1

distinction I want to draw is between a company's CFO

2

or,

3

someone in the mailroom or even a lower-level vice

4

president of the company.

5

difference in terms of the role that person has at the

6

company and their relationship with the board of

7

directors,

8

they're going to be compensated,

you know,

CEO,

and some low-level -- even take

I

think there is a major

their responsibilities at the company,

I

9

think because,

how

and so on.
here,

while everyone

10

did not grant the award because that was the

11

compensation committee,

these are the highest-ranking

12

people at the company.

And I

13

that have been made apply to them all generally.

think the allegations

14

And in the complaint,

15

there are specific allegations as to probably most of

16

these individuals.

17

that made a presentation at the Cancer Society

18

meeting.

19

again,

20

And I

21

company was such that the allegations applied to --

I

I

know that

believe that Khleif was someone

Petit is quoted in a press release.

And,

the other people have very significant titles.
think it's fair to infer that their role at the

22

THE COURT:
I mean,

I

So let me try it a little

23

differently.

get the point that you could

24

infer them to have the same knowledge as members of
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1

the comp committee and,

2

officer defendants,

3

could be made since they managed the company,

4

asking somewhat of a different point.

5

it to asking whether you have any authority.

6

indeed,

presumably,

with respect to the
a stronger inference
but I'm

And let me tie

Which is it's one thing to grant and
You're on the line for that.

7

be the decision-maker.

8

You sort of have to own that.

9

receive something.

Is there some authority that you

10

can point me to that,

11

know it was spring-loaded,
MR.

12

It's another thing to

just by receiving it,

if you

that's enough?

PURCELL:

Yes,

Your Honor.

I

13

would point to both Tyson and Weiss,

14

v.

15

support the basic proposition that to the extent a

16

plaintiff has adequately alleged that a recipient of

17

an award was manipulated with respect to its timing,

18

whether it's backdating or spring-loading,

19

extent the plaintiff has put forth allegations that

20

are sufficient to establish,

21

accepted as true in the complaint,

22

a reason to know that the options had been

23

manipulated,

24

Gifford and Conrad v.

Blank,

potentially Ryan

all of which,

again,

I think,

to the

while it's all
that the person had

then that person stays in the case.
THE COURT:

Is that as a matter of a
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1

breach of fiduciary duty claim,

2

claim?

3

MR.

4

THE COURT:

5

MR.

6

finish with

7

the concept --

I

think i t ' s both.

All right.

PURCELL:

THE COURT:

Okay.

And the point I ' l l

we've been going for

8

9

PURCELL:

unjust enrichment

some time -- is

One more variation on that

last question.

10

MR.

11

THE COURT:

PURCELL:

Sure.
I

know I'm hitting you

12

with a lot of hypotheticals but,

13

allowed to do that.

14

fortunately,

So let's assume spring-loading doesn't

15

get by 12(b) (6)

16

fairness

17

their own options on the theory that it wasn't

18

ratified.

19

I'm

for this question,

but you've got a

claim as to the comp committee's approval of

Again,

I get why the three comp

20

committee members stay in.

21

committee members who didn't make that decision?

22

MR.

PURCELL:

How about the other comp

I

think to the extent

23

the spring-loading claim is gone entirely,

24

conceded earlier in response to your question,
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1

is no freestanding allegation of excess compensation,

2

that those claims fall away.
THE COURT:

3

Actually,

I

thought you

4

were challenging their compensation for like being 650

5

grand or something.

6

MR.

PURCELL:

Well,

I'm sorry.

7

talking about anyone that's not a director.

8

misunderstood the question.
THE COURT:

9

10

I'm

So I

I'm focusing on the three

noncomp committee directors.
MR.

11
I

PURCELL:

I'm sorry.

For the

12

directors,

think we have an entire fairness claim

13

based on the amount,

14

that is a claim that is based on the fact that the

15

average director was paid,

16

$650,000 for fiscal year 2015.

17

sufficiently alleged that there are,

18

least,

19

compensation is entirely fair.

based on the overall amount.

I

think,

And

approximately

And I

think we've
at the very

reasonable questions as to whether or not that

Because the peer group -- this is a

20
21

small company,

$540 million in market cap.

22

made allegations based on a compensation study that

23

indicates that,

24

percentile were around I

you know,

We have

the peers in the 50th
think 133,000.
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1

you go to the 75th percentile,

2

175,000,

3

is

4

excess comp claim as to the entire board.

maybe.

So,

here,

we're talking about

the overall level of comp

just so far off the charts that I think we have an

THE COURT:

5

Even if you do,

even if

6

you have an excess -- or even if you have an entire

7

fairness

8

guess

9

to the three noncompensation committee members who,

claim as to the directors'

compensation,

I

I'm trying to understand why that claim has legs

10

admittedly,

11

make the decision to grant it.

12

focusing on.

13

are the recipients of it,

MR.

PURCELL:

but they didn't

That's what I

Yeah.

was

Your Honor,

in

14

thinking about this now,

15

claim,

16

proposition that it was a breach of fiduciary duty

17

simply to be the acceptor of an excess compensation

18

package.

19

if it existed,

I

the breach of fiduciary duty

would have to rely on the

think as to unjust enrichment,

as I

20

understand the elements of that claim,

21

individuals would stay in the case,

22

is whether or not they have realized a benefit that,

23

in equity and good conscience,

24

essentially be disgorged.

So I

those

because the test

is unfair and should
think as to the unjust
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1

enrichment claim,

2

the case.

those individuals would still be in

3

THE COURT:

4

MR.

All right.

PURCELL:

The last point I was

5

going to discuss was the concept of meaningful limits

6

in the plan.

7

defendants'

8

they became on reply.

And this is,
opening brief,

again,

something that in

they weren't as specific as

We went through the Seinfeld v.

9

Slager

10

type analysis as to whether or not there are

11

meaningful director limits in the plan and computed

12

the sums to be,

13

81 million,

14

And then there was a provision that the defendants did

15

not appear to be relying on,

16

5.4 of the plan,

17

of 200,000 shares.

18

relying on that because if that's the best number they

19

can come up with,

20

characterize that as a meaningful limit because the

21

amount of money we're talking about is $4.5 million.

22

I

think,

for an overall limit,

for overall individual limit,

61 million.

which I think is Section

that does set a limit for directors

I

And I assume that they weren't

it's fairly ridiculous to

think under the case law,

23

no way a meaningful limit.

24

not a meaningful limit.

that is in

A vesting requirement is

The fair market v alue
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requirement is not a meaningful limit.

2

THE COURT:

I'm sorry.

3

just said this and I

4

the 4.5 million is calculated how?
MR.

5

6

was distracted for a second.

PURCELL:

THE COURT:

8

MR.

10

THE COURT:

THE COURT:

18

as of the time we filed

Well,

PURCELL:

Multiplying.
What was the per-share

value you used?
MR.

PURCELL:

Whatever the stock was

trading at at the time.
THE COURT:

So you were assuming these

19

were outright grants of shares,

20

something like that.

21

how did you

calculate the per-share value?

14

17

So calculating the

I believe it was --

the complaint.

MR.

16

Right.

PURCELL:

13

15

Taking those 200,000

per-share value times 200,000,

11
12

So

shares --

7

9

You probably

MR.

PURCELL:

not options or

In fact,

Your Honor,

I

22

believe that the plan has a vesting requirement that

23

doesn't apply to the directors.

24

think the directors could get options or could get an

So under the plan,
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I think the vesting

1

award that vested right away.

2

requirement only applies to the officers.
THE COURT:

3

I was

just trying to

I mean,

the case is

4

understand your calculation.

5

discussing options,

6

sense of what this $4.5 million means that's in the

7

plan.
I

8

9

can go read it and figure it out,

but if you'd explain it to me,
MR.

10
11

and so I'm just trying to make

200,000 shares,

PURCELL:

I think we took the

which is -THE COURT:

12

it would be easier.

13

by whatever it was,

14

something.

And you just multiplied it

the market price at the time or

15

MR.

PURCELL:

Right.

16

And,

again,

I

that in no way,

shape,

or form is a meaningful

think under the case

17

law,

18

limit such that it could be said that shareholders

19

have said in approving the plan that it's perfectly

20

fine for the directors to pay themselves up to that

21

amount.
And if Your Honor has no further

22

23
24

questions -THE COURT:

I

just have one.
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1

nobody has really addressed and I guess I want to know

2

what your position is on Count III.

3

disclosure-related claim.

4

MR.

5

THE COURT:

6

I guess it's the

The disclosure claim.

PURCELL:

Yeah.

What is the nub of

your claim and why do you think it survives?
MR.

7

PURCELL:

The nub of the

8

disclosure claim is that the 2015 proxy was false and

9

misleading,

not because,

as the defendants say,

it

10

failed to include self-flagellating disclosures but

11

because it did not disclose anything about the

12

reason -- honing in on the specific reason why the

13

board decided to make grants under a new plan that had

14

not yet been approved by shareholders contingent on

15

shareholder approval.

16

In other words,

why was it so

17

important that the awards be granted with an exercise

18

price as of March 30th and made contingent on

19

shareholder approval,

20

opposed to simply waiting until after the shareholder

21

meeting occurred and there had been a vote.

22

thus tying the two together,

And so it really does,

of course,

23

relate directly to the spring-loading allegations.

24

But the plaintiffs'

position,

of course,
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1

the defendants needed to include a disclosure that

2

said "spring-loading," but the point is that there is,

3

in our view,

4

issue.

a material omission with respect to that

5

THE COURT:

6

MR.

7

THE COURT:

All right.

PURCELL:

Thank you,
Mr.

Jordak,

8

take a short break and I ' l l come back.

9

pretty brief.

10

But,

that way,

Your Honor.
we're going to
It will be

you won't be interrupted

in your rebuttal time.

11

MR.

12

(A brief recess was taken.)

13

MR.

14

JORDAK:

JORDAK:

Thank you,

sir.

Your Honor,

I have just a

few points that I'd like to make.

15

First,

I think,

as we've said in our

16

papers,

we acknowledge that we are relying in part on

17

decisions that were analyzed under 23.1.

18

very limited body of case law for spring-loading

19

cases,

There is a

and we've tried to look at all of them.
In particular,

20

we believe that the

21

Desimone case most clearly is similar to what we've

22

got here.

23

of it was under 12(b) (6).

24

like it gives a very good legal framework for how to

It was analyzed under 23.1,

although part

In any event,
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1

analyze a stock option case.

2

And I would like to read one quote

3

from the Desimone case which was not in our brief but

4

I

5

last night.

noticed it as I was reading through the case again
I

6

think that i t ' s a good quote.
"Lumping context-specific behavior

7

involving various motivations into generic categories

8

such as

9

such labeling,

.. .'

spring loading

10

and driving results by

seems unlikely to do justice."
And then,

finally,

one other point,

11

Your Honor.

12

entire fairness applies if there's been no

13

ratification.

14

respect to the three compensation committee members.

We talked a little bit about whether

And that would clearly just be with

15

That's all.

16

THE COURT:

17

MR.

18

JORDAK:

Thank you,

Your Honor.

And what says that?
It's their decision that

was being ratified by the stockholders.

19

THE COURT:

Well,

what if,

ultimately,

20

those payments were shown to be unfair?

21

a recovery from the three noncomp committee directors

22

of the delta of unfairness?

23
24

MR.

JORDAK:

Can there be

I'm not sure about that,

Your Honor.
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THE COQRT:

2

MR.

3

THE COURT:

4

Thank you,

JORDAK:

Mr.

Your Honor.

Purcell,

do you have

anything else?
MR.

5

6

Thank you.

Okay.

Your Honor,

PURCELL:

have 30 seconds or less,

could

I believe.

Going back to Desimone,

7

if I

8

to belabor the point because I

9

explained in our brief why we think i t ' s

I don't want

think we adequately

I do want to respond to the one

10

distinguishable.

11

point that Mr.

12

portion of the case that was decided under 12 (b) (6).

Jordak

just made with respect to the

The one piece of that case that was

13

14

decided under 12 (b) (6)

concerned backdating,

15

was dismissed because the plan at issue provided for

16

awards to be issued on a specific date.

17

made absolutely no sense .

18

claim that fails under 12 (b) (6),

19

been alleged here.

20

Thank you.

21

THE COURT:

22

Well,
I

and it

The claim

And that is the type of
not the claim that's

All right.

Thank you.

thank you for the arguments that

am going to give you a partial ruling

23

were made.

24

now and then take the balance of this motion under
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1

advisement.

2

think I'm in a position,

But part of it is clear to me,
therefore,

and I

to deal with it.

This complaint contains three claims.

3

4

Count I

is a breach of fiduciary duty claim against

5

all the defendants,

6

claim against all the defendants,

7

breach of fiduciary duty claim premised on a candor

8

theory against

9

that

Count II is an unjust enrichment
and Count III is a

just the director defendants.

I

say

just to set the stage.

10

I

am going to deny the motion to

11

dismiss in part as to Counts I

and II in the following

12

sense,

13

the decision of the compensation committee to approve

14

compensation for themselves and their fellow directors

15

is concerned,

16

states a claim for relief .

which is that it's clear to me that insofar as

that that aspect of this complaint

17

And the reason I
I

say that is as

18

follows:

obviously spent a lot of time last year

19

examining the ratification cases,

specifically in the

20

context of compensation matters.

And what I gleaned

21

from that survey of the law,

22

spelled out in sufficiently clear language in the

23

Calma decision,

24

be effective,

and it's all hopefully

is that for a ratification defense to

there must be ratification of a specific
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1

decision.

2

And what underlies that is the notion

3

that there has to be a meeting of the minds,

if you

4

will,

5

the one hand,

6

compensation committee acting on behalf of the

7

company,

8

other hand,

the stockholders who were asked to vote on

9

something.

There's got to be sufficient specificity

about what's actually being approved between,
the company,

in this case,

in terms of what i t ' s doing,

on

the

and,

on the

10

so there is not ambiguity that they're agreeing to the

11

same thing,

basically.

12

Here,

13

following way:

14

a decision on March 30th of 2015 to grant themselves,

15

which is presumptively a self-dealing transaction,

16

their fellow directors a certain number of options.

17

think it was 20,000 for that particular slug,

18

three-year vesting period,

19

are,

20

received 70,000 options.

That's a presumptively

21

self-dealing transaction,

one that presumptively would

22

be governed by entire fairness.

23
24

they are.

First,

this vote was structured in the
the compensation committee made

and
I

with a

but whatever the details

And in one case,

I believe a director

If there had been a valid form of
stockholder ratification,

the standard of review would
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1

have shifted back to business

2

decision.
Here,

3

though,

judgment for that

what the proxy asks for

4

stockholder approval of was stockholder approval of

5

the plan and then contained some disclosure to the

6

effect that grants that had been made to the directors

7

and,

8

had been made on shares that would have come from the

9

new plan,

10

for that matter,

to anybody else for whom a grant

would be nullified,

in effect,

if the plan

wasn't approved.

11

To me,

that is not a situation where a

12

specific approval was sought over the grants to the

13

outside directors.

14

could read in from a vote from that.

15

There are lots of permutations you

If the stockholders approve that plan,

16

I presume it could mean one of three things.

17

were approving the plan.

18

grants that are enumerated under the plan.

19

they're approving both.

20

Maybe they're approving the

frankly,

22

the plan.

23

candidly acknowledged,

24

negative vote,

Maybe

Not clear.

The flip side is,

21

They

and I

think,

the best reading is they're just approving
The flip side is,

as

I

think Mr.

Jordak

if the stockholders had given a

it could mean one of at least three
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1

things.

They're disapproving the plan,

2

disapproving the option,

they're

or they're disapproving both.

3

The point is there's permutations.

4

And where those permutations exist in that format,

5

don't think you have the sufficient meeting of the

6

minds,

7

approval of a specific decision of the compensation

8

committee in this case.

the phrase I'm using here,

to demonstrate

And for that reason,

9

I

I don't think the

10

ratification defense,

11

before me,

12

of review back to business judgment and that there is

13

presumptively at this stage of the proceedings an

14

entire fairness claim which survives the motion to

15

dismiss.

16

based on the record that's

would provide a basis to shift the standard

Relatedly,

I will deny the motion

17

insofar as Count II is concerned,

the unjust

18

enrichment claim,

said in Calma,

19

such a claim would survive,

20

practical matter,

21

And I'm only speaking of the unjust enrichment claim

22

as it relates to the awarding of compensation of the

23

outside directors.

24

based on what I

recognizing,

that

as a

i t ' s probably entirely duplicative.

It may be entirely duplicative,
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1

there is some case law suggesting when claims are

2

duplicative,

3

a couple of cases indicating maybe the better part of

4

valor is to keep them in.

you can knock them out.

And Calma cited

It probably doesn't matter much at end

5

6

of the day,

at least as far as the compensation

7

committee members are concerned,

8

being,

9

caution.

but for the time

I'm going to leave the claim in,

10

as a matter of

I'm not providing any ruling at this
time on I

12

I'm not providing any ruling on Count III because I've

13

got to go back and think about it,

14

providing any ruling insofar as the spring-loading

15

questions that have been discussed today are

16

concerned.

17

that.

18

think essentially two things.

Number one,

11

I

and I'm not

need to also go back and think about

Clearly,

the three members of the

19

compensation committee for purposes of this case will

20

remain in the case based on what I've said.

21

think a little bit about the other three members of

22

the compensation committee,

23

spring-loading claim and in the context of the entire

24

fairness

I

need to

both in the context of the

issue that I've raised,

depending on sort of
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1

how the spring-loading claim works itself out.

2

those are questions that I

3

a little bit.

4

But

still need to think through

The consequence of this,

5

that this case is moving forward.

6

discovery.

7

ought to

8

your case.

9

issues as soon as I

of course,

There is no stay of

I won't grant a stay of discovery,

and you

just presume to move forward and litigate
And I ' l l deal with the balance of the
can turn to them.

10

All right?

11

MR.

12

(Court adjourned at 3:43 p.m.)

JORDAK:

is

Have a good day.
Thank you,

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

22
23
24
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